What Are Pet Banks? Understanding Jackson’s Controversial Choice

The term “pet banks” is a somewhat derogatory label applied to a group of state-chartered banks that became depositories for federal funds in the United States during the presidency of Andrew Jackson. This controversial system emerged in the 1830s as a direct consequence of Jackson’s determined opposition to the Second Bank of the United States and his dramatic “Bank War.” Understanding what pet banks are requires delving into the political and economic battles of this era, and recognizing their significant, if ultimately problematic, role in American financial history, culminating in the Panic of 1837. This article will explore the origins, operation, and legacy of these “pet banks,” examining their impact on the American economy and their place within the broader narrative of Jacksonian democracy.

The Bank War and the Rise of Pet Banks

To fully grasp the concept of what pet banks are, it’s essential to understand the context of the tumultuous “Bank War” waged by President Andrew Jackson against the Second Bank of the United States (BUS). Jackson’s presidency (1829-1837) was marked by a fierce struggle over the future of the national bank, an institution he deeply distrusted and ultimately dismantled, paving the way for the rise of these state-level alternatives.

Andrew Jackson’s Opposition to the Second Bank of the United States

Andrew Jackson’s animosity toward banks, and particularly the Second Bank of the United States, was deeply rooted in his personal experiences and political philosophy. His distrust stemmed from a combination of factors, ranging from his own financial setbacks to a Jeffersonian suspicion of centralized power and financial institutions.

Jackson’s personal aversion to banks traced back to land speculation deals gone sour in his early career. As historian John Steele Gordon notes, a complicated land deal in 1795 involving promissory notes left Jackson with a “lifelong horror of debt and debt’s various instrumentalities.” This personal brush with financial instability fueled a broader skepticism towards paper money and credit systems, which he associated with fraud and instability.

Philosophically, Jackson, like Thomas Jefferson before him, harbored a profound distrust of centralized financial power. He viewed the BUS as an institution that favored the wealthy elite at the expense of the common man. In his view, the Bank represented a “monied aristocracy” that threatened the principles of republicanism and democratic governance. Jackson believed that such a powerful entity, unaccountable to the people and controlled by private stockholders, posed a danger to American liberty. As Jackson biographer H.W. Brands observed, Jackson feared the “emergence of a monopoly of money” which he considered “inherently dangerous.” He worried about the potential for corruption and undue influence over elections and government policy emanating from such a concentration of financial power.

Politically, Jackson also questioned the constitutionality of the Bank, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland that upheld its legitimacy. He asserted that each branch of government – the Congress, the Executive, and the Court – should interpret the Constitution for itself, challenging the principle of judicial supremacy on this issue. This stance reflected Jackson’s broader populist appeal and his desire to position himself as a defender of states’ rights against federal overreach.

President Andrew Jackson, whose policies led to the rise of “pet banks” and the subsequent Panic of 1837.

The Veto and the Decision to Remove Deposits

The stage for the “Bank War” was set when supporters of the BUS, led by Nicholas Biddle, the Bank’s president, and Senator Henry Clay, sought an early recharter of the Bank in 1832, four years before its existing charter was due to expire. Clay, who was also Jackson’s opponent in the 1832 presidential election, believed that forcing Jackson to either sign or veto the recharter bill would create a winning political issue. He miscalculated Jackson’s resolve and the public’s sentiment.

Congress passed the recharter bill in July 1832, but Jackson promptly vetoed it. His veto message, penned largely by Amos Kendall, was a powerful populist document that resonated deeply with the American public. It denounced the Bank as an unconstitutional monopoly, a tool of the wealthy elite, and a threat to American democracy. As historian Michael Holt notes, Jackson’s veto message was “a masterpiece of political propaganda aimed directly at voters,” framing the issue as a battle between “democracy and aristocracy.”

Jackson’s veto was not just a rejection of the recharter; it signaled his determination to dismantle the Bank altogether. Having won a resounding victory in the 1832 election, which he interpreted as a popular mandate against the Bank, Jackson moved to cripple the institution further. He decided to withdraw federal government deposits from the BUS, even before its charter officially expired in 1836.

However, the law stipulated that the Secretary of the Treasury, not the President directly, had the authority to remove deposits. Initially, Treasury Secretary Louis McLane, and subsequently William J. Duane, refused to comply with Jackson’s wishes, believing the removal to be financially unwise and potentially illegal. Jackson then appointed Roger B. Taney as Treasury Secretary in September 1833, a man who wholeheartedly shared his anti-Bank views. Taney promptly issued an order to cease depositing federal funds into the BUS and to begin placing them in selected state banks – these state banks became known as “pet banks.”

What Are Pet Banks? Definition and Selection

So, what are pet banks exactly? The term “pet banks” refers to these state-chartered banks chosen by the Jackson administration to receive federal deposits after the removal of funds from the Second Bank of the United States, starting in 1833. The moniker “pet banks” was pejorative, suggesting favoritism and political patronage in the selection process. Critics argued that these banks were chosen not for their financial soundness but for their political loyalty to the Jackson administration and the Democratic Party.

The selection process, overseen by Treasury Secretary Taney, aimed to identify state banks that were considered safe and solvent, and that were supportive of the administration’s policies. However, the criteria for selection were somewhat subjective, and political considerations undoubtedly played a role. Banks with ties to Jackson’s political allies and those that were willing to provide credit to support westward expansion and economic development favored by the administration were more likely to be chosen.

As historian Robert E. Wright and David Cowen describe them, “pet banks” were “state-chartered banks loyal to the Jackson administration.” The number of “pet banks” grew over time. Initially, in 1833, there were a relatively small number, but by 1836, as many as thirty-three state banks were designated as depositories for federal funds. These banks were located across the country, but a significant number were in the West and South, regions supportive of Jacksonian democracy.

While the Jackson administration maintained that these banks were sound and capable of handling federal funds, the “pet bank” system was inherently more decentralized and less regulated than the national banking system it replaced. Unlike the BUS, which had branches across states and a degree of federal oversight, “pet banks” were individual state institutions, subject to varying state regulations and with no central coordinating mechanism. This decentralized system, as events would soon reveal, had significant weaknesses.

The Era of Pet Banks and Economic Consequences

The era of “pet banks,” from 1833 to the Panic of 1837 and beyond, was a period of significant economic experimentation and ultimately, instability. While Jackson and his supporters believed they were promoting democracy and curbing the power of a dangerous financial monopoly, the consequences of dismantling the BUS and relying on “pet banks” proved to be far-reaching and largely negative.

Transferring Federal Deposits to Pet Banks

The actual process of removing deposits from the BUS and transferring them to “pet banks” began in the fall of 1833. Secretary Taney ordered that federal revenues would no longer be deposited in the BUS, but instead in the designated state banks. Existing government balances in the BUS, however, were to be gradually drawn down to meet government expenses.

This removal of deposits was a politically charged act, vehemently opposed by Whigs and supporters of the BUS. They argued that Jackson was exceeding his constitutional authority and undermining the nation’s financial stability. Senator Henry Clay led the charge in the Senate, introducing resolutions to censure Jackson for his actions. However, Jackson remained resolute, convinced that he was acting in the best interests of the country and fulfilling the will of the people.

Nicholas Biddle, president of the BUS, initially responded to the deposit removal by contracting credit. He hoped that this would cause economic distress, forcing public and political pressure on Jackson to reverse his policy and potentially leading to a recharter of the Bank. This contraction, however, while causing some initial economic unease, did not achieve its political objectives. Instead, it further fueled public distrust of the BUS and strengthened Jackson’s narrative of the Bank as a powerful and potentially harmful institution.

The transfer of deposits to “pet banks” had several immediate effects. Firstly, it significantly weakened the Second Bank of the United States, reducing its financial power and ability to regulate the national currency and credit. Secondly, it boosted the financial resources of the “pet banks,” increasing their lending capacity. This influx of federal funds, combined with a general atmosphere of economic optimism and speculation, contributed to a rapid expansion of credit and lending by state banks across the country.

The Specie Circular and Growing Instability

As federal land sales soared in the mid-1830s, fueled by readily available credit and speculative fervor, concerns grew about the soundness of the currency and the potential for a land bubble. Much of the payment for public lands was being made in banknotes issued by state banks, many of which were perceived as being of questionable value. Senator Thomas Hart Benton, a staunch advocate of “hard money” (gold and silver), and Jackson himself became increasingly worried about this situation.

In response, and in an attempt to curb speculation and ensure the government received payment in sound currency, Jackson issued the Specie Circular in July 1836. This executive order mandated that after August 15, 1836, payments for public lands could only be made in gold or silver coin, or “specie.” While the Specie Circular aimed to promote fiscal responsibility and restrain speculation, it had unintended and destabilizing consequences.

The circular created a sudden demand for specie, particularly in the West, where land sales were booming. To comply with the order, land purchasers and banks in the West had to scramble to obtain gold and silver. This led to a drain of specie from Eastern banks, particularly in New York City, the nation’s financial center. As historian Peter L. Rousseau notes, the Specie Circular “reduced the specie reserves of the deposit banks in New York City” significantly.

Furthermore, the Specie Circular, combined with other factors such as the Distribution Act of 1836 (which mandated the distribution of the federal surplus to state governments), and a downturn in the British economy, contributed to a growing financial strain on the American banking system. The demand for specie intensified, and banks began to struggle to meet redemption requests for their banknotes.

The Panic of 1837: Pet Banks Under Pressure

The culmination of these financial pressures arrived in the spring of 1837, with the onset of the Panic of 1837. In May 1837, banks in New York City, facing a run on specie and dwindling reserves, suspended specie payments – meaning they refused to redeem their banknotes in gold or silver. This suspension quickly spread to banks across the nation, triggering a widespread financial crisis.

The “pet banks,” which had been central to Jackson’s financial experiment, were particularly vulnerable. Many of these state banks, encouraged by the influx of federal deposits and a lax regulatory environment, had engaged in risky lending practices and over-issuance of banknotes. When the crisis hit, they lacked sufficient specie reserves to withstand the run on their deposits. The decentralized and unregulated nature of the “pet bank” system, in stark contrast to the centralized control of the BUS, proved to be a major weakness during this period of financial stress.

The Panic of 1837 was a severe economic downturn, marked by bank failures, business bankruptcies, widespread unemployment, and a sharp contraction of credit. The “pet bank” system, intended to democratize finance and promote economic growth, instead became a contributing factor to a major financial crisis. The lack of a central bank to regulate currency and credit, and to act as a lender of last resort, left the American economy exposed to shocks and instability.

The Aftermath and Legacy of Pet Banks

The Panic of 1837 exposed the inherent flaws in the “pet bank” system and had lasting repercussions for American financial policy. The crisis discredited the experiment with decentralized state banking and highlighted the need for a more stable and regulated financial system.

The Failure of Pet Banks and the Independent Treasury

The “pet bank” system effectively collapsed in the wake of the Panic of 1837. Many of these banks, overextended and under-reserved, failed or were forced to curtail their operations drastically. The federal government found itself with its funds deposited in unstable and unreliable institutions.

President Martin Van Buren, Jackson’s successor, faced the daunting task of managing the economic crisis. While under pressure to rescind the Specie Circular and provide relief to businesses and banks, Van Buren, influenced by Jacksonian principles and “hard money” advocates, doubled down on the policy of separating the government from the banking system.

Van Buren proposed the creation of an Independent Treasury system, also known as the Subtreasury system. This plan aimed to completely divorce the federal government from private banks. Under the Independent Treasury system, government funds would be held in government-owned vaults (“subtreasuries”) and all government transactions would be conducted in specie. This system was designed to eliminate the risks associated with depositing federal funds in private banks, whether national or state, and to promote a “hard money” economy.

After a protracted political battle, the Independent Treasury Act was finally passed in 1840. While it represented a victory for the Jacksonian “hard money” faction, the Independent Treasury system proved to be inflexible and ultimately short-lived. It lacked the capacity to effectively manage the nation’s currency and credit needs, and it was repealed by the Whigs in 1841 after they gained power. However, the Independent Treasury concept was revived by later Democratic administrations and remained a feature of the American financial landscape until the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913.

Long-Term Economic Impact and Lessons Learned

The experiment with “pet banks” and the subsequent Panic of 1837 had profound and long-lasting economic impacts. The crisis ushered in a prolonged period of economic depression that lasted for several years, hindering economic growth and causing widespread hardship. It also contributed to a political realignment, strengthening the Whig Party as an opposition force to the Democrats and their Jacksonian policies.

More broadly, the “pet bank” era and the Panic of 1837 offered important lessons about the nature of banking, financial regulation, and the role of government in the economy. It demonstrated the inherent instability of a decentralized and unregulated banking system, and the importance of a central mechanism for currency and credit control. While Jackson’s motives in dismantling the BUS were rooted in democratic ideals and a desire to curb financial power, the unintended consequences of his policies highlighted the complexities of financial management and the need for sound economic principles to guide policy decisions.

The experience with “pet banks” ultimately contributed to a growing recognition of the need for some form of central banking in the United States. While the debate over the structure and role of a central bank would continue for decades, the failures of the “pet bank” experiment underscored the limitations of relying solely on state-chartered banks to manage the nation’s finances. The establishment of the Federal Reserve System in the 20th century can be seen, in part, as a long-term response to the lessons learned from the “pet bank” era and the financial instability that characterized the Jacksonian era.

Conclusion

In conclusion, what pet banks are is best understood as a product of Andrew Jackson’s “Bank War” and his determination to dismantle the Second Bank of the United States. These state-chartered banks, chosen for their political loyalty and intended to replace the national bank as depositories of federal funds, became a central feature of Jacksonian financial policy. However, the “pet bank” system, characterized by decentralization and limited regulation, proved to be unstable and contributed significantly to the Panic of 1837. While Jackson sought to promote democracy and curb financial monopoly, the experiment with “pet banks” ultimately underscored the need for a more robust and centralized approach to financial regulation and monetary policy in the United States. The legacy of “pet banks” serves as a cautionary tale about the unintended consequences of well-intentioned but economically flawed policies, and the enduring importance of sound financial institutions for economic stability and prosperity.

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For Further Reference:

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2. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, p. 295.
3. Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, pp. 201-202.
4. John Steele Gordon, Hamilton’s Blessing: The Extraordinary Life and Times of our National Debt, p. 47.
5. Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions, p. 43.
6. Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions, p. 48.
7. Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 205.
8. Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions, pp. 50-51.
9. Harlow Giles Unger, The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation’s Call to Greatness, p. 296.
10. Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846, p. 136.
11. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, p. 125.
12. Robert E. Wright an David J. Cowen,Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Ric, p. 170.
13. Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay and Calhoun, p. 66.
14. Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions, pp. 62, 51-52.
15. Edward Pessen, Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics, p. 150.
16. Davis Rich Dewey, Financial History of the United States, p. 156.
17. Robert E. Wright and David J. Cowen, Financial Founding Fathers: The Men Who Made America Rich, p. 173.
18. Susan Hoffmann, Politics and Banking: Ideas, Public Policy, and the Creation of Financial Institutions, p. 52.
19. Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay and Calhoun, p. 206.
20. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, pp. 126-127.
21. Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon, editors, Congress and the Emergence of Sectionalism from the Missouri Compromise to the Age of Jackson, p. 193 (Jenny B. Wahl, “He Broke the Bank, but Did Andrew Jackson also Father the Fed?”).
22. Walter A. McDougall, Throes of Democracy, p. 68.
23. Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War, p. 442.
24. Andrew Burstein, The Passions of Andrew Jackson, p. 199.
25. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson, pp. 75-76.
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27. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, p. 125-126.
28. Stephen F. Knott, Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth, pp. 31-32.
29. Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson, p. 76.
30. Woodrow WIlson, History of the American People, Volume IV, p. 43.
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32. Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, p. 362.
33. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, p. 126.
34. James Daniel Richardson, editor, a Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, 1789 1908, Volume 3, p. 108.
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38. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth, p. 124.
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40. John Steele Gordon, An Empire of Wealth: The Epic History of American Economic Power, p. 127.
41. Woodrow Wilson, The History of the United States, Volume IV, pp. 51-53.
42. Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay and Calhoun, pp. 206-207.
43. H. W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: A Life and Times, p. 461.
44. (Letter from Henry Clay to Nicholas Biddle, September 11, 1830).
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49. Stephen F. Knott, Alexander Hamilton and the Persistence of Myth, p. 32.
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66. (Letter from Nicholas Biddle to Henry Clay, August 1, 1832).
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74. (Andrew Jackson, Bank Veto Message, July 10, 1832).
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78. It is was sometimes difficult to separate differences of personality from differences of policy. Historian William Graham Sumner wrote in the mid-1830s that the anti-Jacksonians “took up cudgels in behalf of banks and bank paper, as if there would be no currency if bank paper were withdrawn, and as if there would be no credit if there were no banks of issue. In their arguments against the bullionist party, they talked as if they believed that, if the public Treasury did its own business, and did it in gold, it would get possession of all the gold in the country, and that this would give it control of all the credit in the country, because the paper issue was based on gold.” William Graham Sumner, Andrew Jackson, p. 389 Robert V. Remini, Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union, p. 405.
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