Peter Boghossian’s A Manual for Creating Atheists emerged onto the scene in November of last year and swiftly garnered attention, evidenced by its numerous reviews on platforms like Amazon.com. As someone with a keen interest in the discourse surrounding atheism, I was intrigued to delve into Boghossian’s methodology for, as the title suggests, “creating an atheist.” This review will explore the strengths, weaknesses, and more contentious aspects of A Manual for Creating Atheists.
The Merits of Boghossian’s Approach
Contrary to what the title might imply, A Manual for Creating Atheists isn’t solely focused on the direct conversion of individuals to atheism. Boghossian articulates a broader objective:
“The goal of this book is to create a generation of Street Epistemologists: people equipped with an array of dialectical and clinical tools who actively go into the streets, the prisons, the bars, the churches, the schools, and the community – into any and every place the faithful reside – and help them abandon their faith and embrace reason.”
This definition positions the book within the realm of epistemology, a philosophical discipline concerned with the nature of knowledge and how we acquire it. Boghossian advocates for a “street epistemology” that moves beyond mere assertion, aiming instead to guide individuals toward a more reasoned understanding of the world. This emphasis on reasoned inquiry is a commendable goal.
Peter Boghossian, author of “A Manual for Creating Atheists,” advocating for reason and critical thinking.
Boghossian’s expertise shines particularly in his application of the Socratic method. His adept use of questioning to guide individuals towards specific conclusions is evident throughout the book, likely stemming from his extensive practical experience. His background, detailed on Portland State University’s website where he teaches, includes a doctorate in education focused on utilizing Socratic techniques to enhance reasoning skills among prison inmates. This approach was aimed at fostering self-reflection and reducing recidivism. The book effectively showcases Boghossian’s Socratic method through numerous sample dialogues, illustrating conversations with individuals exhibiting what he perceives as flawed reasoning.
Furthermore, Boghossian offers advice to aspiring street epistemologists that resonates with principles of effective communication in general: acknowledging limitations and admitting ignorance. He stresses the importance of being “comfortable in not knowing and not pretending to know.” This humility is a valuable asset in any intellectual or interpersonal exchange.
However, the scope of Boghossian’s street epistemology extends beyond general critical thinking. He frames it as an interventionist mission: “Your new role is that of an interventionist. Liberator. Your target is faith. Your pro bono clients are individuals who’ve been infected by faith.” This framing marks a shift towards a more critical and potentially problematic stance.
Areas of Concern
Boghossian posits that the most direct route to atheism lies in challenging not religious doctrines or conceptions of God, but faith itself. He views faith as the bedrock of religious belief. His definition of faith is “belief without sufficient evidence,” arguing that genuine knowledge negates the need for faith. This definition is a point of contention. A more nuanced perspective sees faith, particularly religious faith, as a form of trust – trust in God, or more broadly, trust in individuals or systems. For example, our “faith” in the uniformity of natural laws across time and space is not based on exhaustive empirical evidence but rather a foundational trust in the consistency of the universe.
Boghossian, however, rejects the notion of faith as trust, characterizing it as a form of knowledge claim – specifically, “pretending to know what you don’t know.” The term “pretending” carries a negative connotation, suggesting a deliberate deception on the part of the believer, implying a conscious awareness of unjustified beliefs and a manipulative intent. This contrasts with the idea that individuals may genuinely believe they possess knowledge, albeit mistakenly. In the context of religious belief, the vast majority likely fall into the latter category – those who are mistaken, rather than those who are intentionally deceiving themselves.
The central question Boghossian raises is whether religious faith is ever justified, whether there exists a rational basis for religious belief. While acknowledging that unjustified faith may exist, a blanket dismissal of all religious belief as unjustified requires substantial argumentation. Boghossian’s primary argument rests on the observation that faith-based knowledge leads to contradictory conclusions across different religions. He points to the Christian affirmation of Jesus as the Son of God and the Muslim denial of this claim as an example. From this, he infers that faith is unreliable and untrustworthy. However, this line of reasoning could equally be applied to reason itself, given the profound disagreements among philosophers across various domains. The existence of differing conclusions does not inherently invalidate the method used to reach those conclusions, but rather suggests that errors in inference may occur.
Furthermore, Boghossian’s engagement with reformed epistemology, particularly the work of Alvin Plantinga, a prominent philosopher of religion, is superficial. Plantinga argues that belief in God can be “properly basic,” justified without requiring evidential inference, if God exists and has equipped humans with a faculty for recognizing him. Boghossian’s response largely consists of invoking the “Great Pumpkin” objection, a satirical critique of reformed epistemology, which Plantinga himself has addressed. Given the centrality of faith’s justification to Boghossian’s thesis, a more thorough engagement with reformed epistemology would be expected.
Overstated Refutations of Theistic Arguments
Boghossian confidently asserts that “in the last 2400 years of intellectual history, not a single argument for the existence of God has withstood scrutiny. Not one.” He lists Aquinas’ five proofs, Pascal’s Wager, Anselm’s ontological argument, the fine-tuning argument, and the Kalam cosmological argument as examples of failed arguments. However, the support for this sweeping claim is surprisingly thin. His discussion of Aquinas’ arguments is merely descriptive, lacking both critical analysis and references to substantive critiques. While works like Anthony Kenny’s The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence or even more popular critiques in works like Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion exist, Boghossian offers none. Conversely, scholars like Ed Feser have offered robust defenses of Aquinas against modern critiques.
Regarding the fine-tuning argument, Boghossian cites Victor Stenger’s The Fallacy of Fine-tuning as a refutation. However, Stenger’s approach primarily challenges the premise of fine-tuning itself, arguing against the notion that the universe is indeed finely tuned for life. This stance is not universally accepted, even among non-theistic cosmologists like Stephen Hawking and Martin Rees, who acknowledge the fine-tuning of the universe while offering alternative explanations to theistic design. Rebuttals to Stenger’s arguments have also been published, further complicating the claim of definitive refutation.
In addressing the Kalam cosmological argument, Boghossian simply states that “the possibility that the universe always existed cannot be ruled out,” declaring this the “death-knell” of the argument. This dismissal neglects the philosophical and scientific arguments for the finitude of the past, and again, lacks engagement with relevant scholarship, such as the work of Wes Morriston, who has written extensively on the Kalam argument.
Chapter 7, titled “Anti-apologetics 101,” promises to offer robust responses to arguments for theism, yet it too falls short. In addressing the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Boghossian quotes Adolf Grunbaum, suggesting there is no inherent need to explain existence over non-existence. This response demonstrates a limited engagement with the principle of sufficient reason and the extensive philosophical literature surrounding this question.
While rigorous critiques of natural theology do exist, Boghossian’s presentation does not constitute one, and indeed, suggests a limited awareness of the depth and breadth of the philosophical discourse surrounding these topics.
The Problematic Rhetoric
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of A Manual for Creating Atheists is its aggressive and at times, inflammatory rhetoric. Boghossian suggests that failure to convert someone from faith implies either insincerity on their part (“saving face”) or a form of cognitive impairment (“brain damaged”). In a section titled “Containment Protocols,” he advocates for stigmatizing religious claims akin to racist statements, pathologizing faith as a “contagious mental illness,” discouraging the financial support of apologists by purchasing their books used, and promoting children’s media that depicts “Epistemic Knights” battling “Faith Monsters.”
“A Manual for Creating Atheists” book cover, illustrating its provocative title.
For atheists interested in Boghossian’s approach, a prudent recommendation would be to adopt the Socratic method he advocates while discarding the more aggressive and alienating rhetoric. For believers engaging with “street epistemology” as presented in this book, understanding its underlying assumptions and rhetorical strategies is crucial. It allows for a more informed and reasoned response, demonstrating that faith is not necessarily rooted in irrationality or cognitive deficit, but may be grounded in well-considered reasons that deserve open and charitable examination.
Ultimately, A Manual for Creating Atheists presents a mixed bag. While its emphasis on critical thinking and the Socratic method holds merit, its flawed definition of faith, weak engagement with philosophical arguments, and aggressive rhetoric detract from its overall value and potentially undermine its stated goals.
